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BOOK REVIEW
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860.
By Morton J. Horwitz.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. xvii,
356. No price given.
This is a complex and absorbing book that should be of considerable
importance to courts and lawyers as well as to historians. Professor
Horwitz opens a realm of common law that few could enter without the
assistance of his extraordinarily extensive research. He reviews the state
and federal court decisions in which modem property, tort, contract,
and commercial law were born; he assembles this great mass of law
in lucid chapters that allow the reader to follow the development of
case law in individual decisions. Much of this formative law is here
available to the ordinary reader for the first time.
Horwitz sees a pattern in this law that was first described by Sir
Henry Maine: "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract."' By "status" Maine means
the place of an individual in the group-originally the family-that
defines his rights and obligations. In primitive societies the family's
interests are all, and there is no conception of individual freedom. The
slow progress of morality has broken down the old rigid status relation-
ships and created instead a system of voluntary agreements among free
individuals.
The transition from status to contract occurred with considerable
speed in the English-speaking world at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. The elaborate social relationships of the eighteenth century
were built on the land tenure systems of the Middle Ages; every per-
son's rank was determined in descending order from the King. Dress,
manner, and education were all determined by status:
Appearances on the streets of London and Paris two centuries ago
were manipulated so as to be more precise indicators of social stand-
1. H. MAmnr, ANCiENT LAw 100 (Morgan ed. 1917) (1st ed. London 1861).
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ing. Servants were easily distinguishable from laborers. The kind of
labor performed could be read from the peculiar clothes adopted by
each trade, as could the status of a laborer in his craft by glancing at
certain ribbons and buttons he wore. In the middle ranks of society,
barristers, accountants, and merchants each wore distinctive decora-
tions, wigs, or ribbons. The upper ranks of society appeared on the
street in costumes which not merely set them apart from the lower
orders but dominated the street.2
Legal relationships among persons were defined by their status.
Property was not so much the possession of an individual as the under-
lying substance of the social order, the structure on which the pattern
of social relations was stretched. Real property was a bounded domain
in which one lived and ruled, not an instrumentality of economic
purpose.3
In eighteenth-century London this feudal world was fast disappear r
ing; modern commerce produced a large urban population outside the
traditional status system. The law preserved feudal status, however,
to the satisfaction of the squires and gentry who continued to dominate
political life. By 1832, the underpinnings of the system failed, and
parliamentary reform opened government to bourgeois democracy. In
the United States, the new state and federal constitutions enshrined
individual liberties at the center of government; legislatures and courts
quickly completed the transition to a system of laws regulating volun-
tary agreements among free individuals.
The transition was incomplete, of course, but by and large the
United States and Britain moved from status to contract as Maine
claimed, in a remarkably short period, from the times of the French
and American Revolutions to that of parliamentary reform.
Horwitz agrees that this transition occurred, but he is not as com-
fortable with it as Maine. To Horwitz, the change reflected economic
rather than moral progress. The courts decided to favor economic
development and altered the law to suit their purpose-part of a gen-
eral political decision taken in every state, Horwitz claims. Economic
2. R. SnNNmTT, THE FAL OF PUBLIC MAN 65 (1977). This interesting book pre-
sents the argument that the public status relationships of the eighteenth century made
life less isolated and more civilized.
3. See M. Honwrrz, TnE TRANSFORMATION OF AmmuCAN LAw, 1780-1860, at
31-63 (1977).
4. See R. SENaNErr, supra note 2, at 47-49.
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development was to be fostered and subsidized, but the legislatures re-
fused to provide subsidies directly to economic enterprise. Instead, the
courts were permitted to shift the burden of development onto the hap-
less bystanders injured by defective machinery and negligently operated
railroads.5
The argument is a complex one. Horwitz begins by examining the
role of precedent in American common law after the Revolution. At
first, the colonies continued to follow British precedent, sharing the
British view that the common law represented natural law, and was
based upon a system of immutable principles embedded in the world
and discovered slowly by judges. The fixity of common law was
quickly questioned, however, as the separation from Britain and the
divergence among the several states made it clear that there was not one
common law, but several. This growing divergence among the courts
called attention to the courts' role in making law as legislatures did,
law not always found written in the book of nature."
Horwitz argues persuasively that the collapse of fixed and universal
common law led judges to examine the bases of their decisions, and to
begin making rules based on considerations of what would be best for
society in general. This legislative function encouraged judges to
consult their views of social purpose as well as the merits of the cases
before them.7
Horwitz then proceeds to show, in a series of brilliant chapters that
cannot be briefly summarized, how the law changed in the early years
of the nineteenth century. He shows first that the feudal view of real
property as a private domain was quickly displaced by the new concep-
tion of property as a raw material, as a public good to be exploited.
Tracing new doctrines of eminent domain, prescriptive rights, the Mill
5. In this book, I seek to show that one of the crucial choices made during
the antebellum period was to promote economic growth primarily through the
legal, not the tax, system, a choice which had major consequences for the distri-
bution of wealth and power in American society.
M. HoRWrrz, supra note 3, at xv. Horwitz never says directly who he thinks made
such decisions, but the overall tone gives one the impression of a cabal of lawyers de-
termining the course of national affairs. Karl Polanyi argued that the whole system of
free markets was an invention of lawyers and political theorists, imposed on a reluctant
body politic, but it is not clear whether Horwitz goes this far. See K. POLANYI, T14E
GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Beacon ed. 1957).
6. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 1-31 ("Emergence of an Instrumental Con-
ception of the Law").
7. Id.
[Vol. 1977:178
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Acts (which gave mill owners the right to flood others' property), the
new doctrine of waste (that permitted exploitation of natural resources
without much regard for posterity), and a variety of related themes,
Horwitz shows how the nature of real property ownership changed to
permit economic development.8
The law of nuisance also changed, and was slowly replaced by negli-
gence law, with the result that entrepreneurs could build mills or operate
railroads without much fear of liability for injuries caused to neighbors. 9
The business corporation was born. In one of the most interesting
passages in the book, Horwitz reminds us that corporations were at first
customarily monopolies with extensive quasi-governmental powers, and
that the development of business competition among corporations was
one of the greatest innovations of the common law of the early 1800s.10
Commercial law, of course, underwent equally great changes. Hor-
witz gives an interesting account of the rapid absorption of the old law
merchant into the general common law, a development he links to the
disappearance of a distinct merchant class and the rise in power of
lawyers, who slowly eradicated the competing merchants' courts and
arbitrations." The expansive construction of the federal courts' ad-
miralty jurisdiction helped to absorb the old customary law of trade
into the new common law.12
Finally, we have the "triumph of contract," a fundamental alteration
of commercial law. The old system of rights and obligations defined by
social relations governing mercantile exchanges was completely replaced
by the law of voluntary agreements, a profound change that was clearly
visible in the decisions permitting recovery against insurance companies
even when the insured had been negligent. The insurance contract was
permitted to override the duties owed by one person to another. Status
and social relationships were finally subordinated to the marketplace.13
S. Id. at 31-63.
9. Id. at 61-99.
10. Id. at 109-39.
11. Id. at 140-59.
12. Id. at 250-51. Horwitz notes that the expansion of the common law to en-
compass mercantile disputes was part of the flowering of natural law thinking in the
eighteenth century, but be denies that this contradicts his general thesis that the courts
abandoned natural law thinking early in the nineteenth century. To avoid the apparent
contradiction, he argues that the apparent exponents of natural law in the nineteenth
century were simply dishonest. Id.
13. Id. at 211-53.
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In a concluding chapter, the weakest of the book, Horwitz argues
that legal formalism appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century
simply to mask the new economic motivation of the law, and to con-
ceal its naked purpose.' 4 Throughout the book he insists that this pur-
pose was the "subsidization of economic growth."' 5
The landscape of changing law that Horwitz presents for our inspec-
tion can hardly be ignored. There can be no question that much of the
private law shifted from an older status system to a new structure of
relationships defined by voluntary exchanges in the marketplace. The
shift from status to contract occurred, and was accompanied by a gen-
eral agreement that the free market was the means of achieving the
greatest material good for -the greatest number. Displaying this -transi-
tion in detail and breadth, as Horwitz does, is a major accomplishment,
and one on which much further work will be based.
Why the change occurred is another matter. Horwitz is much less
persuasive when he argues that courts intended the changes in the
common law to subsidize economic growth. To begin with, he presents
very little evidence that there was, in fact, a subsidy.' The clearest
case for subsidy is the general practice of granting tracts of land to
development companies, but this instance generally runs counter to
Horwitz' thesis. It was the legislatures, not the courts, that were so
generous with the public domain. The Mill Acts and direct legislative
grants of land were indeed frank subsidies to mills and canals. To the
extent that courts were involved at all, they held fast to older notions of
land tenure. Courts did make it possible for the state to condemn
privately 'held land without compensation, on the theory that all land
14. Id. at 253-68.
15. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. Chapter III is entitled "Subsidization
of Economic Growth through the Legal System." M. HoRwriz, supra note 3, at 63.
16. Free-market economic theory, upon which the courts were presumably acting,
holds that it makes no difference in economic efficiency which party to a dispute is
saddled with liability. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Horwitz acknowledges this in a footnote attached to his introduction, M. HoRwirz, supra
note 3, at xvi n., but does not discuss the point at length. This is surprising in view of
his main thesis that changes in rules of liability worked a considerable transfer of
wealth. Horwitz merely argues in the footnote that Coase's theorem concerns a static
society, but that there are "various allocationally efficient outcomes that relate to dif-
ferent wealth distributions." Id. Although it is true that distribution of wealth is an
initial condition, rather than a result, of the kind of analysis made by Coase, it is still
hard to see why a change in rules of liability should result in a redistribution of wealth.
Rules of liability can be favorable to business enterprise without being at all necessary
or even important in economic expansion.
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was held at the sufferance of the state. Horwitz notes, however, the
feudal view of land ownership, while it was used to subsidize new eco-
nomic ventures, was hardly invented for that purpose.17 The emerging
free-market common law produced a different result: There was to be
no taking without just compensation.' In short, the most significant
subsidies to mills, canals, and railroad companies were made by the
legislatures, and by courts acting on the traditional status-based com-
mon law. When courts modified these doctrines it was to end the
pattern of subsidies.
In the other general areas of law considered by Horwitz, it is even less
clear that the new law of property created any significant subsidy to
private interests. Horwitz notes the changes in the law of nuisance that
clothed private transportation companies with some of the protections
of sovereign immunity, and the gradual appearance of negligence rules
that exempted railroads from most liability for injuries to neighbors.'"
These changes were certainly sought and won by business enterprises in
the courts, and in individual suits the business defendants saved some
money. Horwitz does not estimate the magnitude of these savings, com-
pared to the overall operations of the canals, mills, and railroads. Per-
haps no such estimate can be made. The author fails to discuss the
rules of liability to passengers and customers, which certainly were more
significant economically but much less favorable to business enterprises.
Common carriers were and are held to a high standard of care with
regard to their passengers,"' for instance, and intuitively one supposes
this to have been a more important matter economically to the railroads
and canal companies. Horwitz' thesis would suggest that courts were
much more likely to shift accident losses onto the workingclass passen-
gers of the railroads than onto the property owners along the tracks.
Yet the contrary seems to have happened. Railroads were bound to a
much higher standard of care with regard to passengers, but were gen-
erally able to escape liability for fires in neighboring hay stacks ignited
by sparks. "
It is not difficult to imagine an economic interpretation of these
developments. Wealth was not, after all, a guarantee of solidarity.
17. M. Hogwrrz, supra note 3, at 63-65.
18. Id. at 66-70.
19. Id. at 70-108.
20. See, e.g., W. PROSSEm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 33, at 174-75 (4th
ed. 1971) (citing cases).
21. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 71-78.
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Wealthy landowners of the South and wealthy industrialists of the North
were on opposite sides of a Civil War. The merchants and shipbuilders
of New England represented a set of interests quite different from
either group, the small farmers of the North and West still another, and
the urban mechanics and industrial workers still another. Many of the
cases Horwitz discusses, as in the fires set by sparks from railroads,
involve disputes between industrialists or merchants and landowners.
We are not surprised to find Massachusetts and New York courts favor-
ing merchants over landowners. What is surprising is Horwitz' notion
that this sectional favoritism represents a decision to subsidize economic
development at the expense of the poor, who are not represented in such
disputes and are unaffected by that outcome. The book includes no
discussion of the fellow-servant rule that one would think to be the
clearest test of Horwitz' thesis. Owners were consistently favored over
workers, and industry was evidently subsidized by the courts' refusal to
award damages to injured workmen. The difficulty here is ,that, as
Dean Pound showed some years ago,2" the fellow-servant rule was not a
novelty but a consistent application of prior principles to new situations;
the rule was developed in cases that had nothing to do with industrial
workers and that were decided by judges who had no obvious sympathy
for the new entrepreneurial class.23
Here we meet one of the most serious objections to Horwitz' thesis.
Judges were not all merchants or industrialists. A good many were
planters, farmers, and even democrats. Roger B. Taney, Andrew Jack-
son's Attorney General, was the Chief Justice who did more than any
other to undo the Federalist innovations of Marshall. Taney's state
rights and pro-slavery decisions paved the way to Civil War; yet Hor-
witz would have us believe that Taney struck down the monopoly
privileges at issue in the Charles River Bridge case to protect the rail-
22. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REv.
365, 373-81 (1940).
23. The fellow-servant rule was first announced in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng.
Rep. 1003 (Ex. 1837), in which a butcher was held not liable for injuries to one em-
ployee caused by the collapse of a wagon overloaded by another. Pound points out
that a majority of the court that decided Priestley were squires and landed gentry;
"this was not a bench specially disposed to formulate as law the self-interest of manu-
facturers." Furthermore, "[lt is a safe conjecture that in 1837 the butcher and the boy
working for him . . . would be regarded by the court as of the same class." Pound,
supra note 22, at 374. There was no reason to impose liability on the butcher rather
than the boy, and no earlier cases had done so. The doctrine of vicarious liability was
an exception rather than a general rule. Id.
[Vol. 1977:178
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roads from attacks by chartered turnpikes. Taney may have been
moved by class bias, but it was certainly not a bias in favor of northern
industry.24
By ignoring the possibility of divisions of interest among property
owners, Horwitz avoids some difficult questions. Railroads appeared
rather late in the period he is discussing. It was not until after the Civil
War that the railroads became a significant economic force.2 5  In the
1840s, when much of the legal development Horwitz discusses had
already taken place, railroads were still very modest ventures. The
courts would have needed extraordinary foresight to judge the railroads
worthy of extensive subsidy. Except the textile mills of New England,
there are no important industrial interests represented in the cases dis-
cussed by Horwitz. The clashes of the early nineteenth century tend to
be between merchant and landowner, between landowners, or between
debtor and creditor. The turnpikes and canals were owned by planters
in many instances; George Washington was one of the great projectors
of canal schemes.20 Why are we to suppose that disputes among land-
owners and merchants were decided so as to foster industrial develop-
ment? What class interest favored canals over the plantations they
served?
Even if we suppose there was a subsidy to economic development, it
is not clear why the courts felt obliged to make it. Horwitz argues that
the legislatures declined to levy taxes for this purpose because the only
source of revenue was taxes on property. 7 Refusing to tax the wealthy,
legislatures left it to the courts to tax the poor by freeing developers from
liability for the damages they caused.2 1 The basis of this argument is
that taxes would necessarily have fallen on property,2 9 but Horwitz
24. See M. HoRwrrZ, supra note 3, at 135-37.
25. In the 1850's railroad investment accounted for only 2% of gross national
product and railroads consumed only 15% of iron output; the "maximum direct impact
of the innovation [railroads] did not come until after the Civil War." Cootner, The
Economic Impact of the Railroad Innovation, in TnE RAILROAD AND THE SPACE PRO-
CRAM 107, 113-14 (B. Mazlish ed. 1965).
26. See, e.g., M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITTON OF THE UNITED
STATES 204-05 (1913).
27. "In every state after 1790 a political decision to avoid promoting economic
growth primarily through the taxing system seems to have crystallized." M. HoRwrrz,
supra note 3, at 109. The author means that a decision was made to promote economic
growth through a shift in legal rules of liability, see note 5 supra and accompanying
text, but he does not explain who made such decisions or how they came to be enforced.
28. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 109.
29. Until we know more about the potential redistributive effects of state tax
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offers nothing in support of this view. The Federal Constitution gives
evidence that direct taxes on property were not favored, but other
sources of revenue were available. The taxes levied before and after
the revolution were most commonly excise taxes. Ad valorem taxes on
exchanges of goods-tariffs and stamp taxes, for instance-were the
obvious sources of revenue early in the nineteenth century and their
burden would have fallen on the consumer. In the great political
struggles over tariffs, not mentioned by Horwitz, the new American
industrial class favored protectionism and the merchants and landown-
ers opposed it.80 Tariffs would have financed industrial expansion by
imposing higher prices on the general public, and industrialists favored
such laws. Who then opposed taxes and favored legal subsidies? Cer-
tainly not the landowners who opposed tariffs but who also bore the
brunt of the new rules of liability. There were large shifts in political
opinion regarding tariffs and excises, of course, reflecting the changing
relative positions of the contesting interests, but there is no reason at all
to suppose that legislatures of every state were determined not to tax
their constituents.
Even if we accept a narrow economic determinism, therefore, there is
no reason to suppose that the courts assumed the task of transferring
wealth from the powerless to the powerful. The courts did not always,
or often, represent the emerging industrial class, nor were they always
moved by economic considerations. The law adapted to economic
considerations, but slowly and reluctantly. Judges may have favored
systems of this period, it would be dangerous to make any firm comparisons.
Nevertheless, it does seem fairly clear that the tendency of subsidy through
legal change during this period was dramatically to throw the burden of eco-
nomic development on the weakest and least active elements in the population.
By contrast, it seems plausible to suppose that in a period when the property
tax provided the major share of potential state revenue, the burdens of subsidy
through taxation would have fallen disproportionately on the wealthier seg-
ments of the population.
Id. at 101. The author offers no evidence for this surprising assertion. This factual
uncertainty does not deter him from constructing an elaborate conspiracy theory: "the
choice of subsidization through the legal system. . . entailed more conscious decisions
about who would bear the burdens of economic growth." Id. The passive voice here
masks Horowitz' assertion that some group of people made these decisions. Through
much of the period Horwitz discusses, however, many state legislatures were Republican
in the North and slave-holder in the South. A conspiracy powerful enough to impose
decisions favoring merchants and industrialists on all the state legislatures and courts
is hard to imagine. A Civil War was fought over similar issues.
30. See, e.g., 1 C. BEAXW & M. BEmAD, ThE RIsE oF AmmucAN Crumm oz passim
(1927).
[Vol. 1977:178
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one disputant over another, but the rules of decision were not easily
altered.
[Tihe pressure of new interests has required that the taught tradition
[of law] be made to serve new purposes as old doctrines were called on
to solve new problems. There has been a gradual shaping of obstinate
traditional precepts and traditional doctrines through the need of ap-
plying them to new economic conditions in the light of reshaping ideals
of the legal order.31
The strength and importance of Horwitz book lies not in his narrow
determinist argument but in the wealth of law he presents, conscien-
tiously arranged to show its development in the early years of this
country. The work is so thorough that Horwitz produces ample
materials from which contrary arguments can be constructed.
The judges of the early nineteenth century, as Horwitz shows, were
unable to accept the strict adherence to precedent required of British
courts.3 2  Circumstances had altered, and it was clear the law would
alter also. Courts quite reasonably responded by searching for the
underlying principles of common law to apply to the new situation. In
the eighteenth century, as Horwitz shows, the law was thought to be
grounded in clear external principles governing human conduct: "That
the Common Law, takes in the Law of Nature, the Law of Reason and
the revealed Law of God; which are equally binding, at All Times, in
All Places, and to All Persons." 3  While in summary this view may
appear naive to modem eyes, it was not. The natural law philosophy
imported into political economy and the common law from the Scottish
Enlightenment was a highly sophisticated system of thought that forms
the basis of modem social sciences.34  Society, the Enlightenment
believed, operated according to natural laws just as the physical world
obeyed laws discovered by Newton. The laws of society were percep-
tible to reason and therefore were followed by reasonable persons.
Judges had discovered and codified aspects of these laws, the overall
31. R. PouND, THE FoRarvE ERA OF A MERMN LAw 83-84 (1938), quoted in
Pound, supra note 22, at 367.
32. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
33. Dulany, The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of English
Laws, in THE ENGLISH STATUTES IN M AmY.,M 82 (St. G. Sioussat 1903), quoted in
M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 7.
34. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is still, of course, the basic
work of economics. Blackstone's codification of the common law was a part of this
natural law tradition. See generally D. BoonsTIN, THE MysTmxous SCIENCE OF TH
LAw (1941); H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AmICA (1976).
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framework of which was described by Blackstone, just as Newton had
found -the framework of physical laws.35
Horwitz argues that American judges abandoned this view of the law
entirely, and developed an instrumental conception of jurisprudence that
made the courts instruments of class purposes. The evidence he pre-
sents is not compelling. What he does show quite clearly is that the
new nation rejected the conservative, high-church Tory view that the
common law was an expression of divine will, immutable in all its
details and not to be trifled with by Whig legislatures or democratic
revolutionaries. The colonies rejected the religious view of natural law
in large part, but they adopted its Enlightenment version, and searched
for the general principles by which society operated. 0 They, like the
British Whigs, believed that the customary behavior of people reflected
natural laws, and that the laws followed by courts and legislatures
should express these underlying natural principles. American judges,
not surprisingly, began to feel that British judges had not correctly
perceived the fundamental principles.
Instead of entertaining a blind veneration for ancient rules, maxims and
precedents, we should learn to distinguish between those which are
founded on the principles of human nature in society, which are perma-
nent and universal, and those which are dictated by the circumstances,
policy, manners, morals and religions of the age.37
As Horwitz notes, "no judge of the period acknowledged himself to be
free from -the restraints of 'reason' and 'principle' in formulating legal
doctrine.' 8 Natural law had not been unseated, the courts had only
adopted its Whig variety. In doing so, to be sure, the courts took a
radical step, at least viewed from the perspective of Tory tradition. This
is hardly the conscious instrumentalism that Horwitz claims, however.
Thomas Jefferson, as Horwitz notes, was a leading exponent of the new
rationalism, but it will hardly be believed that Jefferson intended to
advance the interests of merchants against those of yeoman farmers and
the landed proprietors of the south.
35. A contemporary praised Blackstone's Commentaries by saying, "Nor should it
be considered panegyric to say, that this accomplished lawyer has done to the laws of
England, what Newton did to the laws of nature, and Locke to those of human intelli-
gence." THE LAws RESPFCTING WOMEN V (. Johnson ed. 1777).
36. See generally C. CURTIS, LAW AS I.ARGE AS LiF (1959) (reviewing the history
of natural law philosophy in American jurisprudence).
37. N. CHQIPMAN, DISSERTATION OF THE ACT ADOPTING THE COMMON AND STATUTE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (1793), quoted in M. HoRwnrz, supra note 3, at 25.
38. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 25.Washington University Open Scholarship
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The courts were examining custom for the evidence of underlying
principles on which to rest the law, rather than simply advancing the
interests of a particular class. This perspective makes it easier to see
how the law adapted itself to new conditions. The origin of negligence
is a good example.
In the early nineteenth century, as Horwitz perceptively says, "the
story of the rise of negligence in America involves . . . the almost
imperceptible changes in emphasis by which an older status-oriented
conception of failure to perform a duty is gradually laid aside and the
distinctively modem emphasis on careless performance begins to take
its place." 9  In the older cases, the behavior expected of persons was
clear and reasonable; any departure from custom was also a departure
from duty, and liability would attach. The view of negligence as a
departure from custom, firmly founded on natural law philosophy, per-
sisted well into the nineteenth century. The modern utilitarian notion
of carelessness-a failure to calculate the benefits and risks of an
action-did not appear in negligence cases until the turn of the twen-
tieth century40 Holmes, like others who tried to bring order to the new
law of torts late in the nineteenth century, found no trace of utilitarian
analysis in the cases; he rested the whole body of common law firmly on
its old foundation. Liability was founded on fault, which in turn was a
departure from custom and duty.41
Horwitz places the transition to a utilitarian view much earlier, in the
"two decades before the Civil War,"' when railroads first began to
flourish. He cites no cases from this period that show a utilitarian
analysis. Horwitz is in good company when he asserts that a utilitarian
standard was the basis of liability for negligence from its earliest appear-
39. Id. at 88.
40. The utilitarian standard was stated clearly for what appears to be the first time
in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902), in which
the court held that a railroad would be required to take measures to prevent accidents
to strangers, but only to the extent that the cost of such measures was outweighed by the
harm they would prevent. Id. at 902-03, 91 N.W. at 882-83. The utilitarian standard
now most widely used was first stated by Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40, 43
(1915), without any prior authority; Terry's statement formed the basis of the RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1934) which in turn was widely adopted in decisions and
pattern jury instructions. See generally Note, Origin of the Modern Standard of Due
Care in Negligence, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 447, 465-67.
41. See generally O.W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 128-29 (M. Howe ed. 1963)
(the blameworthiness of an act is to be determined by experience which dictates "con-
crete rules" of behavior).
42. M. HoRwn-z, supra note 3, at 98.
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ance as a separate cause of action, but no authorities support this prop-
osition before about 1900.11 Until then the courts were, in fact, fol-
lowing the earlier standard of custom as duty. What perhaps is con-
fusing to the commentators is that the defendants in negligence cases
were generally business enterprises, often railroads, and the custom of
the time was governed by free-market principles. Businesses calculated
their profits, and presumably installed the safety devices that produced
an economically efficient result, without any interference from govern-
ment. Courts simply accepted custom as the rule of law. Adam
Smith's theory was not elevated to ,the height of natural law, and em-
bedded in the Constitution, until later.
The groundwork for this later development was laid in Swift v. Ty-
son,44 decided in 1842. The Supreme Court held that a general federal
common law governed commercial transactions. The opinion by
Justice Story was clearly in the line of traditional natural law decisions
that continued unbroken until 1937. Horwitz carefully notes this
apparent contradiction of his thesis that the exponents of legal subsidy
abandoned natural law, and goes to some length to explain Swift v.
Tyson as a cynical exercise of judicial power.4 i This will not do.
Whatever Story's own motives and opinions, Swift v. Tyson stood with-
out serious challenge for almost a century. It was quite natural for
Story to find a general federal common law, founded on laissez-faire
principles. Horwitz' thesis that natural law had been abandoned, and
the notion of a general common law with it, will not square with the
cases. It was the survival of natural law ,thinking after the Civil War
that permitted the changes in law Horwitz attributes to class interest
decades earlier.48
43. Holmes, for instance, does not suggest that potentially harmful conduct is ever
justified by the good it may bring. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 128-29. This
balancing of costs and benefits, the heart of a utilitarian standard, does not appear in any
nineteenth century authority; although Prosser insists the utilitarian standard was "fun-
damental" to negligence, he cites no case earlier than Terry's essay, supra note 40, for
this proposition. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 31, at 149; Harper and James cite Terry
and the Krayenbuhl case, Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W.
880 (1902). 2 F. HARPER & F. J AmEs, ThE LAw OF TorS § 16.9 (1956). See Note,
supra note 40, at 465-67.
44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
45. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 245-52.
46. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884)
(Field, J., concurring) (among the "inalienable rights" guaranteed by the Constitution
is the right to "pursue any lawful business," citing Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations as
authority).Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Transformation of American Law shows the change, rapid in
historical terms, from the older law of status and social cooperation, to
the new law of individual freedom and competition. Horwitz shows
that this change was not part of a steady progress of morality as Maine
comfortably claimed,47 but a costly and violent process that reflected the
change in material conditions early in the nineteenth century. Horwitz
goes wrong only in thinking that the transition was completed by 1860;
that natural law, status, and custom were completely abandoned as foun-
dations of the law, and replaced by the calculation of social purpose
that we expect of modem legislatures. The law of nature did not dis-
appear so quickly, however. The notion of natural law as a science
capable of producing scientific common law persisted until quite
recently. In the 1920s and 1930s it was still common to speak of the
,'science of jurisprudence,"45 and of course the Supreme Court con-
tinued to hold that laissez-faire economics was a kind of natural law
embedded in the Constitution until 1937.11
The complex status relationships and mutual obligations expected of
people in the Enlightenment, however, were replaced by the simplistic
principles of nineteenth century economics. Social Darwinism replaced
the rationalism of Jefferson, and the law of the market place became the
law of the jungle.50 However unattractive the change now appears to
be, the common law adapted itself to economic realities without abandon-
ing its coherence and continuity as a system of natural principles.
The notions of natural law and status are still with us in many ways.
The new right of privacy is a conscious revival of older notions of
natural law; the legal position of families" and of women 2 is still
largely determined by the status law of the eighteenth century. Even the
47. See H. MAiNE, supra note 1, at 100.
48. See, e.g., Kantorowiez & Patterson, Legal Science-A Summary of Its Method-
ology, 28 COLuTm. L. REV. 679 (1928).
49. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (announcing the
end of substantive-due process im alidations of restraints on freedom of contract).
50. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Court
enacts Social Darwinism into constitutional law); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (Constitution protects "sacred"
property rights, quoting Adam Smith).
51. See, e.g., Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159, 161 (C.P. 1942) ("marriage
is not only a contract but a status and a kind of fealty to the State as well").
52. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (state may restrict
right of women to work as bartenders, and "may deny to all women opportunities for
bartending," without denying equal protection of the laws).
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commercial law still carries the marks of an earlier day; "merchant" is
a status traceable to that in Lord Mansfield's time.5 3 Competence,54
sanity,e5 majority,56 even race, 7 are statuses still recognized in law, and
have not thrown off their eighteenth-century qualities. The newer
natural law of economic competition is, of course, still greatly with us.
Roscoe Pound suggested that the older notions of hierachy and status
might be preferable, in modem times, to the natural law of Social
Darwinism.58 Writing at a time when it appeared to many observers
that the free market had ended its brief reign, and had been replaced
by giant state and corporate monopoly enterprises, Pound suggested a
new codification of mutual rights and obligations to replace the jungle
laws of the market.
The transition from status to contract is not complete, and it is not
likely to be final. We no longer share Sir Henry Maine's view that
British parliamentary democracy is the pinnacle of human evolution; in
large areas we are scrapping laissez-faire law for a different kind of
regulation of economic activity. The new liberalism calls for federal
chartering of corporations (a return to the sort of feudal tenure rela-
tionships that Pound suggested).51
The law moves slowly, however. As the natural law of free markets
is being abandoned in the economic sphere, it is making its first advances
against the still older status of women and families. The economic
revolution of the nineteenth century has not yet brought women into
53. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (definition of "merchant"); § 2-104, Comment 2 ("The
term 'merchant' as defined here roots in the 'law merchant' . . . ."). See generally
Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1977 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 1.
54. In re Palestine's Estate, 151 Misc. 100, 270 N.Y.S. 844 (Sur. Ct. 1934) (alleged
incompetent may not occupy "status" of administratrix).
55. This word is used with varying meanings, of course, but it can designate a legal
status which determines criminal liability and it may be a type of competence. See
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 286-95 (1972).
56. The age of majority is another type of legal status, determined by statute.
See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 2 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
57. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (segregation of Japanese
upheld); 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1970) (definition of "Indian" to include all persons "of
one-half or more Indian blood"); 25 U.S.C. § 480 (1970) ("no individual of less than
one-quarter degree of Indian blood shall be eligible for a loan"). An "Indian" woman,
but not a man, can become a United States citizen by marriage. See 25 U.S.C. § 182
(1970).
58. Pound, The New Feudalism, 16 A.B.AJ. 553 (1930).
59. See R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAINo mTH GiANT COROOrATION
(1976).
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the marketplace, or freed them from the obligations attached to feudal
status. The Equal Rights Amendment is clearly intended to work this
change, and to treat women, like men, as persons whose individual
rights and duties are determined in the abstract, without regard to social
or family role. Sex, in short, is no longer to be a legal status.
Marriage, too, is being viewed for the first time as a contract and not
as a status. 0 Families are now voluntary arrangements, and courts
are free to disturb them in the best interests of the individual members. 61
One may have reservations about the universal triumph of laissez-
faire. Sex is not to be a status, but why should not marriage be one?
It is difficult to view the marriage relationship as a contract. When
marriage is no longer a means of imposing a separate status on women,
it may again become possible to view the family as a status.
Horwitz has given us an important guide to the history of law in the
United States. Like Moses, however, Horwitz seems to have been
denied a clear view of the expanse he has opened to others. His
achievement should not be denigrated on that account. The study of the
continuing change from status to contract law promises to be very
fruitful, and Horwitz has advanced this study considerably.
SHELDON NovIcK
60. "Marriage is a personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out
of a civil contract to which the consent of the parties is essential .... A marriage
may be contracted. . . ." UNIFORIM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 201.
61. See, e.g., UNIFORM JUVENI.E COURT AcT §§ 30-32 (court may transfer custody
of child from natural parents to other individuals or institutions if child is "deprived,"
"delinquent," or "unruly").
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